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THE INCIDENCE OF PROFITS TAXES IN A NEO-CLASSICAL GROOTI! MODEL
Recent tax legislation to stimulate growth and investment by means
of a reduction in capital taxes (increased depreciation allowances and in-
vestment credits) and the labor opposition to such tax decreases has again
raised the question of capital tax (or distributional consequences) to center
stage.
To help answer this question, I propose to put forward a simple neo-
classical growth model which will indicate the long run incidence of capital
taxes when the effect of reduced investment and capital-labor ratio brought
about by such taxes has had time to reach equilibrium with gross wages below
what they otherwise would have been.
It can easily be seen that a decrease in capital taxation will induce
increased investment and capital deepening raising the capital- labor ratio
and possibly increasing long run net real wages (even though the capital
tax reduction Involves an increase in wage taxes) . This increase in the
capital-labor ratio may be the externality to saving to which Marglin [13]
often alludes.
Whether labor would desire such a shift from profit to wage taxes is
not clear, even when the result is a rise in the long run net wage rate.
If labor owned all capital equally and had a discount rate below the present
gross rate of profit, which laborers must if they save, labor itself would
desire that the wedge or inefficiency brought about by the profits tax be
totally removed. Once the tax was removed, labor would be able to save r.o
the point where their consumption discount rate was equal to the marginal
productivity of capital. This would not necessarily bring about the golden
rule suggested by Phelps [18] and Solow [23], since worker's consumption
discount rates could easily exceed the rate of technical change plus popu-
lation growth. (It can be seen that this question is a corollary of the
corporate tax shifting work, of ilarberger [7], Musgrave [16], and Krzyzaniak
[9], and is also closely related to the social discount rate issue examined
by Baumol [1], Diamond [3], Eckstein [A], Feldstein [5], Ilarberger [8], Marglin
[11, 12] , and McKean [14]
.
If labor owns less than all capital they might not desire even a partial
lowering of capital taxes which would raise net real wages. Labor would only
desire a shift from profit to wage taxes if the present discounted value of
the future increase in gross wages that resulted exceeded the present dis-
counted value of increased wage tax payments. Intuitively, it can be seen
that labor will not just want to transfer income to capital because capital
has a higher savings propensity. If so, labor would just save more them-
selves. But, labor may desire lower taxes on capital because: lower capital
taxes raise GNP and thus raise government expenditures with government a
constant proportion of GNP, or lower the general level of taxation to main-
tain the same absolute level of government expenditures; or labor's dis-
count rate is above the gross rate of return on capital, which it must be if
labor does any positive saving.
This paper will consider only two types of tax and transfer instruments;
1) the rate of government spending, and 2) the tax rate on capital from which
3.
the rate of tax on labor can be deduced. If these are the only two types
of transfer possible and wealth is not completely and equally owned by
labor, then labor will want capital taxes which reduce GNP below the
,
modified "Golden Rule" (marginal product of capital = consumption dis-
count rate of labor). But, it must be remembered that our first question
is the measurement of the incidence of capital taxes, not the determination
of the inoptimal level.
These problems have not gone unmentioned in the literature. Masgrave
[16] was pessimistic about the question of determination of the incidence
of capital taxes when he concluded, "No generalization can be made on a_
priori grounds about changes in factor shares in the process of growth.
By the same token, no categorical statement can be made about the distribu-
tional effect of budget policies that expand or retard growth," though he
states that, "since the marginal propensity to save tends to rise as we
move up the income scale, substitution of a progressive for a regressive tax
retards growth." Since his comprehensive book, though, work has been done
on this problem by Harberger [7], Krzyzaniak [9], Mieszkowski [15] and Sato
[20].
Harberger 's analysis of the corporate tax is very Interesting but
incomplete in that it does not incorporate modern general equilibrium
growth theory.
Mieszkowski, working along Harberger 's lines, gives an interesting
treatment of capital tax shifting, though it also fails to take advantage
of the insights offered by general equilibrium growth theory. Diamond [2]
also analyzes the capital tax question assuming all capital is equally dis-
tributed among workers. Sato [22] and Krzyzaniak [9] have done work similar
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to the model presented here, using a less general Cobb-Douglas production
function.
Hamada [6] analyzes lump sum transfers from capital to labor and vice
versa on wages and profits using a general equilibrium. His research is
valuable however limited it is for practical policy questions.
Going further, if there is initially no tax on capital (profits), the
marginal product of capital would be equal to labor's consumption discount
rate, hence it is difficult to see why labor would ever want to make any
transfer to capital. Labor would want lump sum transfers from capital
even if the real wage is eventually lowered due to labor having a lower
marginal propensity to save than capital. In fact, if labor can get lump
sum transfers from capital which they can re- invest free of capital taxes, it
would seem that they would want the immediate transfer of all non-labor ovmed
capital.
5.
The Model
Let us postulate an economy with two factors, labor and capital, and
two taxes, an income tax on wages (t ) and an income tax on profits (t ).
It van be seen that diminishing tax on profits (t ) and raising the tax on
wages (t ) , while maintaining the government sector constant (as a proportion
w
of GNP) will most likely raise the net of tax rate of profits. It is
also possible that this adjustment may raise the net of tax real wage rate.
The reason this distributional adjustment may raise wages is that
lowering the tax on profits (t ) and raising the tax on wages (t ) has two
r w
effects or incidences on wages. The direct effect is to bring about a lov/er
net wage by means of the rise in t , but the indirect effect is to raise net
profits bringing about a larger capital stock and a higher capital-labor ratio.
The higher capital-labor ratio will result in a higher gross wage. If the
indirect effect of the tax shift outweighs the direct effect, the change
will raise long run net profits and wages.
This will be considered in a neo-classical growth model in which the
capital stock and therefore the capital-labor ratio are determined by a savings
function. Savings decisions are realized and investment adjusts. Amplifying
this statement, we are going to use a full employment growth model in which
the equilibrium path (capital labor ratio) of our economy is stable before and
after changes in the tax structure. We will compare the two economies at the
same point in time after all equilibrating adjustments of tax changes have
worked themselves out.
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The model can therefore be used for determining the differential
incidence of various tax structures and the amount of long run shifting
which occurs
.
Assumptions of the Model :
(1) Two factors of production labor, L, and capital, K.
(2) The production function for the economy as a whole is linear homogeneous
of degree one and exhibits diminishing returns to factors.
(3) Perfect competition and full employment of both factors at all times.
(A) No foreign trade or international capital movements.
(5) The consumption goods purchased by capitalists and laborers are of the
same capital labor intensities so that we do not have to become in-
volved in price index questions.
The Model ;
Our production function is as stated Q = F(K,L). National income (Q)
is a function of labor and capital.
Q = F(K,L) or Q/L = f(k) where k = K/L (1)
The competitive conditions are
r = (l-t^)f'(k) (2)
w = (1-t )[f(k) - kf(k)] (3)
w
where r and w are the net rates of profits and wages, respectively, and
t and t are the rates of taxation of profits and wages,
r w f o
Let us first assume that the size of the Federal Budget is held constant
as a proportion of the National Income. Thus, the total taxes collected must
be equal to tQ, the government budget.
This leads to the equation:
tQ = t 'W 'L + t T -K
w g r g
where w and r are respectively the gross wage and profit rates.
This can be rewritten as
tf(k) = t [f(k) - kf'(k)] + t f (k) • k = t f(k) + (t -t )kf' (k)
w r w r w
(4)
or
kf (\c)
t = t [1-A] + t X = t + (t -t )X where A = ——r^ capital's share,
w r w r w f(k)
Labor Is assumed to be supplied inelastlcally and to grow logrith-
mically at the rate n. The supply of labor at any given Cime is
L = Lqb"*^ T - time
Assuming the desired savings of the community is always realized, we get:
K' = I^ = S^ • r • K + S^ • w • L + S tQ = S, K' =
-^l
(5)
or
/s '^ K'
K = S • r + S • wL/K + S t Q/K, K = —
-
r w g K
where S , S , and S are the propensities to save out of profits, wages and
government revenues respectively, herein assumed to be constant, Capitalists
and laborers are assumed to have the same marginal propensity tt sa-e out of
profits.
On the full employment steady-state equilibrium growth path, the rate
of change of the capital stock will equal the rate of change of the labor
supply with a fixed capital-labor ratio.
K = L(=n) with equilibrium k=k (6)
8.
Since we want to examine the effects of lowering t and raisins t
'^ r ^ w
keeping the federal budget constant as a proportion of national output, while (t), tj
will be treated as a parameter of the system. We will examine the effect
of varying t on k, r, w, t and Q.
r w
Our economy will thus move from one stable equilibrium growth path
with k constant and growth steady (at the rate n) to another in which k will
presumably be different while n will be the same.
From (5) and (6), we obtain our equation for equilibrium growth:
n = K = S (1-t )f'(k) + S (1-t )[f(k) - kf'(k)]l/k + S tf(k)l/k
r r w w g
or
nk = kS (1-t )f'(k) + S (1-t ) [ f (k)-kf ' (k) ] + S tf(k) (7)
r r WW g
Differentiating (2), (3), (4) and (7) and solving for the effects of varying
t on k, w, and r (-;
— ,
^^^ and -—) we obtain:
r dt dt dt
r r r
^^
- frtwc: c ^ /-S^(l-t^)f"(k)+S^/kt[f(k)/k-f(k)] + S /k^(l-t )
-j^ - f (k)(S^-S^) / r r g w I w .g^
[f (k)-kf • (k) ] (l/k)-kf'"(k)+tf • (k)-t^[kf"(k)+f • (k) ]
(9)
, -f'(k)/k (S (1-t )+S t f(k)/k-f(k)+S (t-t^)f(k))dr
_
t, w w g w r j
dt " -S (1-t )f"(k) as above
r r r
f'(k)/k (s (t-t )kf'(k)+[S t+S (1-t )][f(k)-kf'(k)]T
_ I r r g w w ^dw
dt ~ -S (1-t ) f "(k) as above"
r r r
(10)
We can now calculate the effect of raising the tax on capital
(t^) with the gross tax level t kept constant, on both wage and
rents (w and r)
,
but we must first discover the signs of the denominator
of these three terms. In appendix I, we prove that the denominators are
guaranteed positive by the assumption of stability. Thus stability is a
dt
r
D
dk
dt
< if S
w
< S
r
9.
sufficient (but as we can show not a necessary) condition for a positive
denominator.
We can now evaluate the effects of a change in t on k, w and r via
the numerators of our equations (8), (9) and (10).
Letting the denominators be denoted by D, equation (8) (which tells
us the effect of a change in t on k) is
dk f'(^>(V^>
thus
The equilibrium capital-labor ratio (k) will be raised by lowering t
(and raising t to compensate for it) whenever the propensity to save out
w
of profits is greater than the propensity to save out of wages (as we would
expect)
.
Examining equation (9) , which tells us the effect of a change in t
on the rate of return to capital r, and using (4) we discover that
dr ^ ^3~ < if 1 + —S- > t when S > 0. Thus lowering the tax on profits
at b w
s t
always raises the net rate of profit as long as t < 1 + ^-°— , which is
w
highly likely.
Lastly, we will analyze equation (10). As we remember, this equation
tells us what effect changing t will have on the wage rate net of tax (w)
.
From (10), we find that -^ < if t > t +
dt r
S S
r r
(A ^-1)
kf
'
(k)
where X is capital's gross share of GNP
^( ^x. >— )•
Therefore lowering t will raise the wage rate net of tax (t ) if
r w
and only if t is higher than the average rate of taxation (t) by
10.
w (1-t ) +
w
(x'-^-i).
In Summary:
J t. dk dr , dw , , ,In order that -7—
-> "tt"" and -— all be negative, we need have;
at at at
r r r
(i) S > S
r w .
S t
(11) 1 +
-jA- > t (If S > 0, otherwise S (1-t ) + S t > 0)
S w w w e
w °
(ill) t > t +
r
w(1-t ) + _a (x-^-i)i
If (i) is satisfied (the m.p.s. of profit earners is higher than that
of wage earners) , lowering t will raise the equilibrium capital-output
ratio and raise the absolute level of the economy's growth path, leaving
2
the long term rate of growth unchanged.
Examining condition (ii) , we see that lowering the tax on profits (t )
will raise the net profit rate (r) in all cases.
We are lastly left with condition (iii) governing the sign of
dw
dt
which in practice will be the only critical condition. If in
addition to conditions (i) and (ii) being satisfied condition (iii) is also
satisfied, the result of lowering t will be to raise r, w, k and F(K,L).
This rule can alternatively be written as t -t ^
by the use of (4) and substitution.
S (1-t )+S t
w w y w
S - S
r 2
,-1
If there is Harrod-neutral labor augmenting technical progress the
model will be exactly the same except for the fact that the rate of growth
will be n+A instead of n (where A is the rate of technical progress).
For a discussion of the question of excess capital deepening, see
appendix II.
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Let us substitute reasonable parameters in our alternative rule (ili),
footnote 1, and see how restrictive this condition would be. Assuming S = 1
"^
2
S = S = i^
,
t = 1^ , and A = 1, (iii) becomes
^ 20 10 3
t > t +
r — w
t > .43
r —
S (1-t ) + S t
w w g w
S - S
r g
A-1
A 43% tax on capital would maximize the long run path of real wages in our
model.
Our model so far assumes the rate of saving out of profits is independent
of the rate of return to savings. It also assumes that all government ex-
penditures, except for government savings, benefits no one—neither capital
nor labor. Government expenditures provide no benefits, except saving, but
instead meet costs a la defense, foreign aid, de-pollution, etc., and further
assumes that government revenues and expenditure are a constant proportion
of GNP. These assumptions are the most pessimistic we could make for the
reduction of taxes on capital to increase long run net real wages.
As long as labor has a positive discount rate, we shall never see labor
desiring to have t (or t - t ) equal to the right hand side of the two
r r w ^
expressions for condition (iii), unless, of course, labor was to own all
capital equally shared, in which case t = would be labor's desire. This
is true because labor must sacrifice income for increased taxes early in order
to supply the capital for higher wages later.
We have so far assumed that government saves part of its funds and
that the remainder of its revenues are given away in foreign aid or used up
12.
in defense expenditures, anti-pollution expenditures, or other costs of
the economy equal to t(l-S )F. This is the least optimistic case for both
labor and capital to the extent that government expenditures are GNP in-
creasing benefits for neither labor nor capital.
If government expenditures raised either real wages or profits, they
would benefit either wage earners directly or profit earners directly. They
could also benefit wage earners indirectly if government benefits accruing
to capitalists increase the rate of saving cut of capital or the real rate
of return on capital. In case government expenditures only increase real
wages, the increased savings by labor do not benefit capitalists, except
perhaps by raising the GNP and lowering the level of taxation in general
(these effects, though, would probably be small), since increased savings
by labor probably lowers the net rate of return to capital more than they
reduce taxes on capital by expanding GNP, In any case, government expenditures
which benefit anyone will lower the minimum rate of t at which net real wages
increase when t decreases (rule (iii)).
Let us quickly examine the most optimistic case for labor (who want
to maximize net real wages) where all government expenditures benefit labor.
Here all G is expended on social non-defense, etc., services.
Wages now become:
w = (1-t )[f(k) - kf(k)] + lf(k) (11)
w
Differentiating, we obtain:
~ = (10) + tf(k)^ (12)
r r
dwSolving for the range of t in which -r— < 0, we obtain the new condition
r
(iila)
t >
-^ (s t + [S t + S (1-t )](X ^-1)) (13)rS^l^w "-g w w' j
13.
or, with S = S , and substituting from (4),
g w
S (A-^-1)
r w
a condition which requires lower levels of t for dw < 0, than under our
r -r- —
dt
r
previous assumption of no benefits from government expenditures. This con-
dition is independent of t because all t is returned to labor. Assuming
A = 1, S =1^, and S = 1 gives t >_ _2 . If t is below 2, raising the3" 20 '^lO "^9 ^ 9
t would increase the long run path of real wages. Let us now set S = S =
r
or o w g
and examine our previous conditions in the no government benefits case which
(i), (ii) and (iii) become (ia)-(iiia).
(i) S > (ia) S >
r r
(ii) with S = (iia) same
g
1 > t
with S = S =
g w
r < always
dt
r
(iii) t > t (iiia) t >
r — r —
In the case where S = S =0, nnd government expenditures are a
g w
constant proportion of GNP which yield no welfare to society, we see that when
tj. = t^ = t, any rise in k brought about by lov/ering t raises r, raises k,
and thus r*k and tf
, but lowers w because the increase in gross w brought
about by the elevated k is more than taken away by the increase in t needed
w
As long as government revenue and expenditures benefit no one and
S = S = 0, dw < as long as t ^ t, but if government revenues are all
^ dt ^
r
spent to the benefit of labor, the rule is dw <_ when t >_ 0, as would be
dt ^
expected.
14.
to maintain G as a constant proportion of GNP.
If we now consider a world in which S = S =0 and G = G
g w
dw
^[f'(k>]'
ir = (i-t )f"(k) < ° "^^" 1 > t^ > .
r r
If instead S > 0, S > and G = G, we obtain dw <
dt
S -1 ^
when t l_w(l-t )(X -1) again assuming X = 1, t = 1
\ ^ 3 " 10.
^ = ^g = to ^^^ ^ = 2 ^Sain gives t^
>
f^.
With G = G, it does not matter to whom further benefits of increased GNP
accrue, since they are fixed and have no marginal impact. It must also be
noted that if S = S , labor will always desire til.
w r r
Now, let us go back to our original case in which G = tF(K,L). Given
the assumption that S > and S = S = S > (the propensity to save
w
^ ^c ''w
out of profits is the same for capitalists and workers) following
Pasinetti [17] and Samuelson and Modigliani [19], it becomes obvious that
eventually all capital will be owned by workers.
Proof: assuming S =
g
(a) k = S (1-t )[f(k) - kf'(k)] + [S (1-t )f'(k) - n]kwww r r w
(b) S (1-t )f'(k) - n = -S (1-t ) f(k) . ^.(^^ k
w
Thus setting k = 0, substituting (b) into (a), and solving for k , we get k = k.
Assuming X = -r, t = -r^r, S = — , S = -rrr^ and substituting in3wlOr2wlO
t ^ 7r-(l-t )(X -1) yields t - -r-r-, so present capital taxes may be set atrSw r50
r
the level which maximizes long run net wages showing how sensitive this rule
1 9 11
is to S . At S = "7 the rule becomes t ^ -ttt or with X = — , S = y- givesqW w4 rlO 4'w6
t > —
"^r
- 10'
15.
Hence, our assumptions cause relatively all capital to be owned by workers
in the long run. This is close to the case examined by Diamond [3], except
that capital need not be distributed equally among labor. In practice,
the assumption that the net (of tax) propensity to save out of profits is
the same for workers and capitalists, S (1-t ) = S (1-t ), may be reasonable,
r r w w
since S < S while progressive taxes and inheritance taxes mean that
w r
t > t .
r r
c w
Once labor owns the entire capital stock, capital taxes, t , might be
reduced to zero. Would t =0,S >S >0 then result in excess capital
r ' r w ^
deepening, (f
'
(k) < n)? With t = t =0, the equilibrium capital-labor
r w
ratio k is determined by:
^f(k)
n = S kf'(k) + S
r w k -^'(^> from (7)
Solving for f'(k), we get:
„-s <i-t )iia
^'W s-S(l-t' <i^'
r w w
and examining (15) to see when f'(k) - n, we obtain:
w f(k) ^^°''
IT"- "^
Substituting reasonable values for the parameters of (16), S = -r-, n = ^,
and — = "7, we calculate S 5 -r for f'(k) > n. Hence, excess capital
k 4 w 8
deepening is extremely unlikely.
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Appendix I :
An investigation of the sign of D the denominator of equation (8) , (9) and
(10).
For the system to be stable, K must be below n when k. is above equili-
brium k, and K must be below n when k is below equilibrium k. Therefore,
stability implies dK be negative.
dK
n = K = S (1-t )f'(k) + S (1-t )[f(k)-kf •(k)]l/k + S tf(k)l/k (11)
r r w w g
Graphing K and n against k, we see that for stable equilibrium dK^ must
dK
be negative. " ^
K=l dK
K dT
n
n
*-\ /% /\
^\K>n
k=K-n
^Ss^^
-^ /\
_ _ L
s^ K=n K<n
..1 ,,
k -*- IT equil
,
Differentiating K with respect to k in (11) and using equation (4) we
obtain:
-dK = -S (1-t )f"(k) + S t[f(k)/k^-f '(k)/k] +
dK ^ ^ ^
S /k[kf"(k) + f(k)/k-f'(k) + tf'(k) - tf(k)/k - t kf"(k)]
w r
(12)
I17,
which must be positive for stability.
Now let us examine the denominator of (8), (9), and (10) which we shall
denote by capital D. Using equation (4)
!
D = -S (1-t )f"(k) + S t(f(k)/k^) -f ((k)/k) +_jw kf"(k)
r r g
^
+ f(k)/k-f'(k) + tf'(k) -tf(k)/k-t kf"(k)
which is equal to -dK the stability condition which must be positive.
dk
Thus D = -dK > and the denominators of (8), (9) and (10) are all positive,
dk
18.
Appendix II
:
An alternative method of looking at our criteria and examining the
question of whether or not there is excess capital deepening la- to solve (4)
and (7) for t and t yielding:
r w
(l-t ) = nk-[S^(l-t) ^ S^t]f (k) ^^3j
^
(S -S )kf'(k)
r w
(1-t ) = t^r^^"''^ "^ S^t]f(k)-nk
"^ Is -S )[f(k)-kfTk)T~ (16)
r w
Our assumption of t ,t < 1 implies:
[S (1-t) + S t]f(k)<nk (17)
w g
and
:
nk<[S (1-t) + S t]f(k) (18)
r g
w = (1-t )[f-kf'(k)] = j^a-t)jj^t]faoj^
"
s -s
r w
We know that in the range where lowering t increases dk < „ so we
dt
r
can solve for dw .
dk -
dw S (1-t) + S t]f'(k)-n ^
dk
S -S
r w
19.
in any range where
dw dk
.<:
dk ' dt
"'
r
and
[S (1-t) + S t]f'(k) > n
r g -
f (k) >
S (1-t) + S t
r g
which will almost always be greater than n.
We also see that at maximum w, k will stop increasing before the Golden Rule
is reached, unless t is to decrease to the point where w is actually lowered,
bounded by taxes on wages, t , being less than one, t < 1.
w w
f(k) > nk
[S^(l-t) + Sgt]
Y > nk
S (1-t) + S t
r g
X> 5-
K - S (1-t) -I- S (t)
r g
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